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ABSTRACT
The impact of various manning levels aboard Naval escort
type ships was examined. A constant level of ship perform-
ance was attempted through changes in equipment and procedures.
The impact of various combinations of men and equipment on
ship design and acquisition cost was evaluated using a ship
synthesis model. The cost of crew, fuel, and added shore sup-
port required because of reduced manning was determined for
each manning level. These costs were combined with acquisition
cost to produce a modified life cycle cost. The performance of
each ship developed in the study was evaluated on a subjective
basis. By combining the results of life cycle cost and ship
performance, conclusions were drawn about the optimum manning
level aboard the next generation of Naval escorts.
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Prior to the 1970* s the cost of manpower had been a com-
paratively small part of the Navy's annual budget. In the
early 1970*3 the draft was ended and Congress made an attempt
to make military pay equivalent to civilian pay. This pay in-
crease had a dramatic impact on the Navy's budget. By 1975
manpower cost was an estimated 65% of the budget, and 55% of
the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of an average ship. (1) (NOTE:
Numbers refer to references at the end of this thesis.)
Besides the high cost of manpower, there are a number of
other compelling reasons to lower the crew size on Naval ships.
In an address to the American Society of Naval Engineers on
3 May 197^, Vice Admiral W. D. Gaddis stressed the fact that in
the future the supply of skilled people will be limited. A
500,000 man Navy has been selected for planning purposes be-
cause that is the maximum force level set forth by law in a non-
emergency environment. According to the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, there will be a decline of approximately 2.2 million
males in the 18-2^ age group during the 1980* s. The elimina-
tion of the draft, the base force limit of 500,000, and the
decline in the number of men in the prime service age group
make it important for the Navy to search for ways of utilizing
it's manpower as efficiently as possible. (2)

The impact of the crew on ship size and cost is an im-
portant consideration, A large crew requires either a larger
more expensive ship or a smaller payload.
A final reason in support of smaller crews on warships is
to reduce loss of life in combat. Warships, by their very
definition, will go in harms way and some will be damaged or
lost. To expose any more people than necessary is a waste of
life.
1.1 Survey of Past Results
Two noteworthy papers have been published which examine
the requirement for and the effects of reduced shipboard man-
ning.
Reference 3 developes a combat system for two Frigate
Hydrofoils (PPH):
FFH 83 uses existing equipment and has a crew
of 78.
FFH 90 uses equipment under development and
has a crew of $$.







The low manning level was achieved by use of:
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Highly integrated command and control (C&C)
and weapons control system
Aircraft type ship control
Gas turbine propulsion plant
Reduced maintenance due to built-in- test,
increased reliability, and redundancy in
key areas
Strong shore support
Large billet cost savings were possible over conventional
ships with the same mission. Comparison of crew cost with two
more conventionally manned frigates in 1974 dollars are shown
below:




A final conclusion of reference 3 was that a ship like FPH 83
is feasible in the 1980 »s.
References 4 and 5 examined four manning alternatives for
escort type ships with crews ranging from 62 to 21 men. They
investigated the feasibility of significant changes which can
at the same time reduce manning and improve military capability.
Using the PP 1052 as a design point, reference 4 indicates
that the impact of the crew aboard a small surface combatant
is 5 tons/man and 600 ft^/man. These figures were for the




One of the key results of reference ^ was an awakening to
the price of support personnel. The PPG 7 has 50% fewer watch-
standers when compared to the PP 1052, but there is not a sim-
ilar reduction in the number of support personnel. In addition
to no reduction in the equipment maintenance load, the FPG 7
has the same requirements for, and system of, accomplishing it's
support functions. A final conclusion was that the most desir-
able means of achieving a reduction in manning requirements is
through the outright elimination of duties, functions, equip-
ment maintenance or other requirements.
Other studies have covered small parts of the overall
manning problem, most notably in the area of ship control.
Reference 1 deals with bridge manning. The conclusions of this
study were:
Ship control has changed little in 50 years.
A 50# reduction in bridge personnel with
little or no equipment change is possible.
Modest equipment changes can reduce the
required personnel to an officer of the
deck and a ship control console operator.
Tradition is the largest single obstacle to
reduction of bridge watch personnel.
References 8 through 10 are a series of reports by the
Naval Sea Systems Command on the subject of ship manning. This
series contained surveys of ongoing developments which will
have an impact on ship manning, such as, new materials, new
weapons systems, and changes in procedure. They were also
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intended to spark Interest in, and discussion of reduced manning
throughout the Navy, Further research and development was
urged in the areas of:
Equipment reliability and availability
Automation of shipboard functions
Ship rearrangement to promote efficiency
Doctrinal changes
1.2 Present Trends in Manning Aboard U.S. Naval Ships
Beginning in i960 a new method of manning prediction
started to replace the old system based on experience and rules
of thumb, (6 and 7) This was because the old system had re-
sulted in large errors in the prediction of the crews required
for various Naval ships. At the same time, it was also felt
that a greater design effort was required to integrate men into
the total ship system. A modified British work study process
was adopted for the U.S. Navy. Unlike the British system, the
American system is applied during the design phase. The name
"Design Work Study" (DWS) was chosen to identify this process.
Essentially, DWS consists of a synthesis of method study, work
measurement, and industrial engineering techniques adapted for
management use. The final goal of the DWS process is the
achievement of the most economical and efficient combination of
payload, support subsystems, and manpower that will allow the
new design to accomplish it*s assigned mission.
Since it's inception, DWS has been applied to the DD 963,
13

PPG 7, CVAN 68, DLGN 38, and AO 177 plus a number of designs
which did not go to the contract phase. The manning reductions
on these ships range from 19% for the DLGN 38 as compared to the
DLGN 36, to 55% for the AO 177 as compared to the AO 105. How-
ever, it should be noted that this reduction is only partly due
to DWS. The major part of these manning reductions was due to
changes in mission or technology and would have occurred whether
or not the DWS discipline had been initiated.
The trend to reduced manning in the latest design in each
class of surface combatant ships is clear in Figure 1. The
same information is shown in Figure 2 normalized in terms of
men per kiloton full load displacement.. Here a steady trend
toward fewer men per ton can be seen over the past thirty years.
There are two reasons for this trend. Figure 2 shows that the
larger ships tend to have fewer crew members per ton, thus the
trend to increased displacement in post World War II ships re-
duces the crew member to displacement ratio. The second reason
for the decreasing crew to displacement ratio is a greater ef-
fort to reduce manning and increase automation.
More specifically, this manning reduction is due to the
application of some or all of the following items to the more
recent ship designs.
The use of gas turbine in place of manual
control steam plant
Integrated digital combat systems in place
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Mechanization of missile and ammunition
handling
Reduction in bridge manning
Aircraft type maintenance approach for
some equipment
1,3 Scope of Present Work
In general, previous studies have shown that crew cost can
be reduced with automation and procedural changes, and that
much smaller ship's crews are possible by 1990. They have not
covered in any depth a number of other aspects of the problem,
such as:
Impact on ship size when equipment to support
the low manning level is added to the ship
Impact on ship acquisition cost
Impact on ship life cycle cost, particularly
the cost of increased shore support
Impact of ship performance
Impact on the Navy's personnel system
In addition, most of the previous studies have had only
limited scope, while the more complete ones have passed over
the near term in favor of more long range solutions, with crew
sizes of 80 or less.
The main goal of this thesis was to determine what combi-
nation of personnel and equipment would be the most effective
for a typical ocean escort. The thesis deals with near term,
the type of ship that could go into design today with low risk
systems and a mid-range of crew sizes (80-200). The Navy is
17

unlikely to build a ship with less than 80 people before it has
built a number of ships with 80 to 200 people. The PPG 7 with
a crew of 182 is the first step in this direction. It is im-
portant to note that this ship and the DD 963 and A0 1?7 are
under attack within the Navy because of their small crews.
Several more years of experience will be needed to evaluate
these ships which are the first of the ships with reduced man-
ning.
The analysis was carried out in the following five steps.
1. Eight manning options and ships were developed
for a typical ocean escort mission.
2. The impact on size and acquisition cost of
each option was determined.
3. A modified life cycle cost was determined.
4. The performance of each option was evaluated.
5. The impact of reduced shipboard manning on





The details of the analytical approach are covered in this
chapter. A summary of the method is given below.
1. Manning and Equipment Options
Eight manning and equipment options were
developed starting with a conventional manned
ship with a typical ocean escort mission.
The crew size was varied from 276 to 70 men,
while equipment and procedures were changed
to keep performance as constant as possible.
2. Ship Impact
The size and cost of each of the eight
ships were determined using a ship synthesis
model.
3. Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
The ship acquisition cost from the synthesis
model was combined with the following elements
of LCC to give a modified life cycle cost.
Thirty year crew cost
Thirty year fuel cost
Cost of extra shore support required
for ships with low manning
Elements of LCC which would be constant for any
crew size were not evaluated.
k. Ship Performance
The performance of each ship was evaluated
using the conventionally manned ship as a
baseline.
5. Other Impact of Reduced Manning
The smaller, highly skilled crews of ships
with low manning, combined with the need for
shore support will require changes in the Navy's




2.1 The Manning and Equipment Model
The ships in this study were to be capable of performing
the functions of a typical ocean escort. These functions




In addition to these combat functions, certain support services
must be provided, such as:
Medical services
Commissary and other human support services
Maintenance of equipment
Administrative functions
An improved FP 1052 was chosen as the base ship because it
has the features listed above. In addition, it was the last
ship to be constructed with little attention to reducing crew
size. This allowed a wide range of crew sizes to be studied.
The FF 1052 used in this study was assumed to have the follow-
ing changes to the equipment it had at commissioning.
Manned helicopter in place of a drone
Basic Point Defense Missile System installed
Harpoon antiship missile installed
MK-^8 torpedo system removed
A more detailed list of the functions and capabilities






Deteot aircraft at long and short range
Engage aircraft with five-inch gun
Engage aircraft with missiles at short range
Control aircraft
Antisubmarine Warfare
Detect submarines at long and short range
Engage submarines at long and short range with conven-
tional weapons
Use own helicopter in antisubmarine warfare role
Surface Warfare
Detect surface contacts
Engage surface contacts with gun
Engage surface contacts with missiles
Conduct electronic warfare
Conduct Naval gun fire support
Use own helicopter in surface warfare role
Mobility
Steam at full power








Visit, search, and prize crew
Command and Control
Communicate by visual and electronic means
Process message traffic










Enter and leave port
Refuel and rearm underway
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ROC (Required Operational Capabilities). These functions and
capabilities were held constant where possible on each of the
ships with different manning options. Any changes in perfor-
mance of the functions on this list will be discussed in the
section on ship performance.
Crew size determination was the first step. The Navy uses
the DWS method which was discussed briefly in the introduction.
A part of this system is the Manpower Determination Model com-
puter program. (7) It has a data base made up of the manning
required for various systems and subsystems that are found
aboard Naval ships. The program uses this data base in ad-
dition to information such as work week and nonequipment related
work load. After insuring optimum cross-utilization of persons
nel, a document similar to a Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill
is produced. At present, this model is only applicable to con-
ventional manning determination. A data bank for more austere
manning, such as found on the FFG 7, is under development, but
is not fully completed. Even if it was available, it would
not be applicable to the ships at the low manning end of this
study. Because of this, another method of manning determina-
tion had to be used.
The manning document for the PP 1052 (11) serves as a
starting point in developing the various manning options. Prom
that point the crew size was reduced and equipment and operating
doctrine changed to allow the smaller crew to perform the
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functions in Table 1. At sea watch stations (Operational Man-
ning) during Condition III were the predominant factors in
selecting crew size.
Eight ships were developed in the study counting the
modified PF 1052. For the purpose of easy identification, the
ships were numbered 1 through 8 starting with the FF 1052.
The crew selections for ships 2 and 3 were made using references
12 through 14- as guides to operational manning. These refer-
ences represent the most current developments in shipboard man-
ning. Ships k through 8 have operational manning and equipment
similar to FFH 83 in reference 3. In general, references 3
and 12 through 1^ could be used for equipment selection and
operational manning, but did not cover all aspects of the re-
quired manning.
The other types of manning are shown below. (15)
Maintenance Manning, which can in turn be broken
down into three types.
Preventive maintenance, or that main-
tenance required to prevent failure of
equipment.
Corrective maintenance, or that main-
tenance required to restore to service
failed equipment.
Facility maintenance, which is the
normal cleaning and painting required
to keep the ship livable and attractive.
Administrative and Support Manning, which is the
manning required to perform ship's office, medi-
cal, supply and commissary functions.
Utility Manning, which is the miscellaneous
ZUr

work that Is required, but does not fall
into any of the above categories. The
largest item in this group is special
details such as Sea and Anchor.
The PP 1052 Manning Document contains detailed information
on the required hours of each type of manning listed above.
The Manning Document also details how the required work is as-
signed to the crew members. For the purpose of crew size selec-
ion in this study, the level of detail in the manning was not
required. It was adequate to divide the types of manning listed
above into categories that are dependent on crew size, ship size,
and shipboard equipment. Each category was adjusted appropri-





Personnel and pay record functions
Interior facilities maintenance
Ship Size
Hull maintenance (Exterior facilities maintenance)
Shipboard Equipment
Maintenance of weapons, electronics, and
machinery
All the functions shown above were easy to categorize ex-
sept facilities maintenance. After discussions with the Naval
3hip Engineering Centers DWS group, facilities maintenance was
iivided into its exterior and interior components. The ex-
terior component is predominately a function of deck area,
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which for ships of similar shape is a function of the square
of ship length. The relation shown below was used to calcu-
late the required exterior facilities maintenance.
HPM1 x (I^/I^) 2 = HF!^
Where: HFM1 332 hr/week, the hours of
exterior facilities main-
tenance required aboard the
modified FF 1052 (Ship 1)
L^ Length of ship 1
L = Length of ship n
HFI1 = hours of exterior facilities
maintenance required aboard
ship n
Interior facilities maintenance was assumed to be a direct
function of crew size. The hours of interior facilities main-
tenance required aboard ship 1 (886 hr/week) were changed in
proportion to crew size changes to obtain an estimate for the
other ships in the study. Both of the assumptions above have a
small error, however the results were accurate enough for the
purposes of this study.
Utility, administrative, and support manning were held con-
stant at the values for the FF 1052, except where they were de-
pendent on crew size. The time required for personnel related
functions, such as commissary services, was reduced in pro-
portion to crew size reductions. At sea maintenance of equip-
ment and in port activities were not considered at this point
in the analysis. Any deficiencies in these areas were assumed
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to be transferred to a shore support activity. This will be
iiscussed in the sections on shore support and ship performance.
Reference 15 describes the Navy Standard Work Week, which
*as used to assign work to the crew members. The Navy Standard
rfork Week is intended to be used for planning purposes when
preparing ship's manning documents. It divides the week into
time required for functions, such as eating and sleeping, and
time available for assignment to work. Time lost to training,
nilitary duties, and inefficiency was subtracted from the
total time available to obtain productive hours of work per
week.







Che in port productive hours shown above were reduced by ad-
iitional 10$ to account for leave and training away from the
ship.
The helicopter detachment requires a few comments. Some
studies (3) have integrated the helicopter detachment into the
ship's company, and thus affected a manning reduction. However,
a ship capable of carrying a helicopter doesn't always have a











to break down. For this thesis the helicopter and it's crew
were considered to be part of the payload, and thus not sub-
ject to integration or reduction in size. In addition, ser-
vices provided by the ship's crew (primarily fire fighting
during flight operations) were assumed to be constant. It is
recognized that some reduction in helicopter manning is possible
if the expense of cross training is accepted, or if a more re-
liable helicopter is developed. However, the manning for the
helicopter detachment remains at three officers and eleven
enlisted for all eight ships investigated in this study.
The development of the crew and equipment options which
has just been discussed is the most important part of this
thesis. The crew size and the equipment load are inputs to the
rest of the analysis for each ship. The final output and con-
clusions are no better than the information and assumptions on
which the crew size and supporting equipment are based.
The results will be more accurate for the ships with larger
crews compared to ships with smaller crews. This is because
large crews are based on operating ships, or ships under con-
struction, while the small crews are based on systems or con-
cepts which nave not been tested in service. The validity of
ships k through 8 depends largely on the accuracy of reference
3. If the systems and concepts discussed in reference 3 perform
satisfactorily, ships 4 through 8 will be feasible. If the




The ships in this study are unconventional when compared
to other Naval ships. It was assumed that Naval Regulation
and tradition would accomodate their unusual characteristics.
In practice regulations and traditions change slowly, and these
ships would meet opposition if they were introduced into the
fleet.
2.2 The Ship Design Model
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) synthesis model
CODESHIP (16) was used to determine the ship impact of the var-
ious crews and equipment used in the study.
A synthesis model takes as input information a ship designer
is likely to have at the start of conceptual design, such as,
payload, propulsion plant type, and hull coefficients. The out-
put of the model is estimations for the ship's characteristics
such as, length, displacement, and cost. This estimation is
based on regression analyses of past designs. A flow diagram
from reference 16 for the CODESHIP model is shown in Figure 3«
Reference 16 describes the ship synthesis model CODESHIP
in it's original form. An updated version supplied by CNA has
the following added features:
Gas turbine power plant option
Updated data base






















Figure 3. CODESHIP Calculation Approach (16)
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For this application a number of additional changes were
required,
1970* s habitability standards were included
Electrical heat was assumed
Diesel generators were assumed
The hull weight estimation was reduced by 10#
because CODESHIP tends to overestimate the
hull weight for small ships
The gas turbine plant cost estimation was
increased to reflect recent cost information (18)
The impact of improved habitability, electrical heat, and
diesel generators was based on the PPG 7. The change in hull
weight estimation was based on the CODESHIP documentation it-
self. (17) These changes were incorporated into the CODESHIP
model
•
Because the object of this analysis was to evaluate the
impact of crew and equipment changes, all other inputs to the
synthesis model were held constant. The ships in the study
were assumed to have:
Hulls geometrically similar to the FP 1052
Gas turbine main propulsion (two LM-2500
engines)
Pour 1000/kw diesel generators
Electrical heat
Habitability standards similar to that of
the PFG 7
The fact that all the ships in the study have the same
hull coefficients, but different displacements and lengths,
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affects hull performance. The optimum hull geometry for the
pp 1052 may not be the optimum geometry for a smaller ship.
In comparison the PF 1040 and PF 1052 classes cover the same
size and speed range as the ships in the study. The hulls of
the FF 1040 and PF 1052 are a close match, thus the use of
geometrically similar hulls for all the ships in the study will
not adversely affect the results.
Gas turbines were used in every ship, except ship 1, which
was assumed to be a 1200 psi steam plant for crew selection. In
addition, the Navy has made the decision to use gas turbines in
all the recent escort designs. The gas turbine main propulsion
system led to the selection of electrical heat and diesel gener-
ators. Based on the FFG 7, the electrical power required for
these ships is 1000 kilowatts greater than required for the
FP 1052 because of the electrical heat. This was assumed to be
constant for all the ships in the study.
Note that the two LM-2500 gas turbine engines provide a
total of 40,000 horsepower compared to the 35,000 provided by
the 1,200 psi steam plant in the PF 1052. This results in the
ships in the study having a higher speed than the FP 1052. In
addition, the smaller ships developed in the study will have a
slight speed advantage over the larger ships. This must be
taken into account when comparing the performance capabilities
of the eight ships.
Because it was important to analyze a large variation in
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crew size, ship 1 was assumed to have the same propulsion plant
as the FF 1052 for the purpose of crew selection, even though
it has a gas turbine propulsion plant. Thus ship 1 is manned
as if it were a steam ship, but input into the ship synthesis
model as a gas turbine ship. This avoids the sudden change in
ship characteristics that would result if ship 1 was input into
CODESHIP as a steam ship, and the rest of the ships in the study-
as gas turbine ships.
A sample input to the CODESHIP model for the FF 1052 as it
was constructed is shown in Appendix 1 along with the results
from the program. Also shown is a comparison of the predicted
results with the actual FF 1052 characteristics. The close
comparison increases confidence in the model. The Center For
Naval Analyses has found the CODESHIP model to be accurate to
within 15% for virtually all cases, and within 6% for most
cases. With the modifications made in this study to make
CODESHIP more suitable for escort type ships, the accuracy is
assumed to be within 5%» The relative accuracy between the
ships in the study should be even better than the absolute
accuracy.
2.3 Ship Acquisition Cost
Estimating the acquisition cost of a new ship is a dan-
gerous undertaking for a ship designer. The cost escalation in
the ship building industry has run far ahead of that for the
economy as a whole. The rapid cost escalation has reduced the
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value of past experience and caused cost estimations for ships
to be notorious for their inaccuracy. All cost estimations for
this analysis were done in terms of January 197^ dollars be-
cause this is the last year for which crew costs were available.
The CODESHIP model discussed in the last section has an
acquisition cost subroutine and it was used to do the cost
estimation* Unlike most cost estimations, which are based on
weight groups only, CODESHIP uses a different approach. CODE-
SHIP divides acquisition cost into three parts.
Construction Cost
This is the cost incurred in the
builders yard. This includes mate-
rial, labor, and services normally
provided by the builder.
Government Furnished Equipment Cost
This is the cost of components pro-
vided by the government to the ship-
builder. It is covered in the Payload
Shopping List. (17)
Development and Other Cost
This is the cost incurred by the
government during the design and
development stage. Also Included
here is the cost of test and instru-
mentation, and the cost of stock
spares.
The Center For Naval Analyses provided the information
required to calculate construction cost. This was based on
historical data from shipyards which actually built escorts
in 197^. This information is presented in Table 2.





Year of cost 197^
Number of ships produced 50
Inflation rate from base year (1968) 7%
Labor rate #^.98/hr.
Overhead 92#




data base of the CODESHIP model. The only equipment addition
not covered by CODESHIP was the equipment required to support
reduced bridge manning. Discussion with personnel at Naval
Ship Engineering Center revealed a strong feeling that an in-
tegrated bridge console, with automatic steering and collision
avoidance devices, would cost no more than the equipment pre-
sently installed. Because of this, the cost changes in bridge
equipment were disregarded.
Development and other cost were input to the CODESHIP
model as zero to permit a more detailed analysis by hand. The
output was then adjusted to account for development, test and
instrumentation, stock spares, and construction plans cost.
These costs were estimated using reference 19 (First Cost of
Ships Report, Oct. 1975) as a guide. The total cost of de-
velopment and other cost for each ship in the study was av-
eraged over an assumed 50 ship buy, and this average cost added
to the CODESHIP output to obtain total acquisition cost. The
cost of construction plans and stock spares were relatively
uniform for all the escort type ships in reference 19, thus a
representative value was easy to obtain. The cost of test and
instrumentation and development varied widely among the ships
in reference 19. The variation was largely dependent on the
complexity of the combat system, and in the case of the PPG 7,
the use of a new type of power plant. The ships in this study
were assumed to use the same power plant as the PPG 7 class,
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thus no large outlays for development or testing were required
for propulsion. The combat systems, including the software
required to permit reduced manning, range from the simple sys-
tem used on ship 1, to a much more complex system used on ships
k through 8. The development and other cost were estimated by
comparison with ships of similar complexity in reference 19.
In all cases zero equipment development and testing cost were
assumed because only existing or near term equipment was used.
The Acquisition cost estimation is an important part of
this analysis. Personnel at the Center for Naval Analyses con-
sider the acquisition cost subroutine to be "sufficiently ac-
curate for trade-off comparisons" , but have not determined the
error range. The input for construction cost is considered
accurate because it was based on historical data. The devel-
opment cost estimated is probably the most inaccurate element
of this analysis, however, the effect on the final results is
small. The fact that a 50 ship buy was assumed means that a
large error in the development cost estimation will have little
impact on the average cost of the 50 ships.
2A The Ship Life Cycle Cost Model
The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a ship is the total cost as-
sociated with the ship from conceptual design until disposal of
the ship at the end of It's useful life. For this analysis, it
wasn't necessary to evaluate every item in the LCC, but only
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those that change with manning. Major items considered were:
Ship acquisition cost
Thirty year crew cost
Thirty year fuel cost
Additional shore support required be-
cause of low manning.
The cost of repair parts, ammunition, overhaul, modernization,
and supplies were not considered in the model. These items
were assumed to be the same regardless of crew size. Some error
is involved. The cost of repair parts and overhaul will vary
slightly from ship to ship in the study due to different equip-
ment and maintenance philosophy. Also, the cost of supplies
(especially provisions) is dependent on crew size. These two
factors tend to offset each other because the ships with small
crews will tend to use the more expensive plug-in, plug-out
maintenance approach, but require less provisions.
The ship acquisition cost was discussed in the last sec-
tion. The crew cost and fuel cost are clearly items that change
with crew size and ship size, and thus required evaluation. All
ships require some level of shore support. The only shore sup-
port calculated for the ships in the study was for support in
excess of the support the PP 1052 requires. The extra shore
support is required because of the small crews on some of the




2.4.1 Thirty Year Crew Cost
Using the manning options developed for each crew size
and reference 20 (Annual Manpower Billet Cost for Life Cycle
Planning) , the annual cost of each crew was determined. Ref-
erence 20 gives the total cost to the Navy for each paygrade
and skill in terms of January 197*+ dollars. Total cost in-
cludes not only pay, but also training, travel, retirement,
and other indirect costs.
In business it is a common practice to discount future
cost using the cost of capital. It is also common to inflate
future cost by some assumed inflation rate. The importance
of discount and inflation to a government agency is question-
able. Navy practice has been to disregard both effects when
conducting trade-off studies. The same procedure was used in
this analysis.
2.4.2. Thirty Year Fuel Cost
The ships in the study were assumed to be underway 50%
of the time and in port 50% of the time. The assumed underway
speed-time profile is shown below.
Speed Percent of Underway Time













Using the FF 1052 speed-power curve (21), the underway
profile, and the fuel consumption curve for the LM-2500 engine
(22), it was possible to estimate the fuel consumption for a
gas turbine powered FF 1052. The fuel rate varied from 1.8
tons/hr at 10 knots to 8.3 tons/hr at 26 knots. This includes
an assumed electrical load of 2000 kilowatts supplied by diesel
generators with a specific fuel consumption of .6 lb/hp-hr.
The weighted average for all underway time is "}.0k tons/hr.
The weighted average of fuel use multiplied by the hours under-
way/year will give the fuel used/year.
The C0DESHIP model does not estimate a speed-power curve
as part of it's routine, so the average fuel consumption of the
ships in the study could not be calculated directly. When a gas
turbine powered version of the FF 1052 was run on CODESHIP, it
was noted that the fuel consumption at endurance speed was
3.07 tons/hr. This is very close to the average fuel consump-
tion of 3.0k tons/hr just calculated. This relation was as-
sumed to exist for all the ships in the study. Average fuel





Endurance range/Endurance speed fuel rate in tons/hr.
Where: Endurance fuel is CODESHIP output
Endurance range is ^500 miles
Endurance speed is 20 knots
40

Thirty years of fuel cost were calculated using the relation
below.
Average fuel rate x 4380 hr/yr x 30 years x $94.20/tons
Life cycle cost of fuel
The fuel price of $94.20/ton is equivalant to $12.00/bb. As
with crew cost, no discount or inflation were taken into ac-
count.
2.4.3 Additional Shore Support
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter only
shore support in excess of what the FP 1052 requires was cal-
culated in the LCC model. The base level of shore support re-
quired by the FF 1052 was disregarded in the LCC model.
Before the cost of the additional shore support could be
calculated, the hours required in each skill had to be deter-
mined. There are over 100 skill groups aboard the FF 1052. To
have analyzed each one separately for each ship in the study
would have required too great of detail. The individual
skills were grouped into six similar categories. The cate-
gories are shown below.
Combat Systems, made up of highly skilled
personnel trained in electronics
Operations, made up of personnel who
operate the electronics
Deck, made up of personnel who do un-
skilled work such as hull maintenance.
4l

Ship Control, personnel who stand bridge
watches
Engineering, personnel who maintain and
operate the engineering systems
Support, personnel who provide support
services to the rest of the crew
The hours available and the hours required per week for
each type of manning discussed in Section 2.1 were determined
for each of the categories above. Preventive and corrective
maintenance manning were determined from the equipment list for
each ship. The time available in each of the above categories
was calculated based on the Navy Standard Work Week presented
in Section 2.1. When hours required exceeded the hours avail-
able per week in any of the skill categories, a shortage ex-
isted. This shortage was assumed to be transferred to a shore
based support group.
This method worked well for the 50% of the time the ships
were assumed to be underway because of the data available in
the FP 1052 Manning Document. However, no information was
available in the manning document concerning in port routine.
The DD 963 Manning Document {Ik) is the first to cover in port
routine. The reason in port manning received little attention
before the DD 963 Manning Document is because the worst case
manning condition was assumed to be at sea under war time con-
ditions. Recently with the provision for six-section liberty
in port, plus more time required for leave and training away
from the ship, in port manning has approached the limiting
k2

factor. This shift requires that in port manning receive as
much attention as at sea manning.
The DD 963 and the ships in this study are similar in
many ways. They have the same type of mission and to a large
extent the same type of equipment. They both have helicopters,
a large sonar, the same 5-inch gun, and the same type of power
plant. Because of this, the ratios of in port to at sea work
load for the DD 963 were used to estimate the in port work
load for the ships in this study. Prom this, plus the assumed
in port watchstations, the amount of outside support required
per week could be determined for in port in the same manner as
it was done for at sea. Eecause a 50% underway time was as-
sumed, the results for at sea and in port could be averaged
to provide the average amount of shore support required. The
assumed in port watchstations for the ships in the study are
shown in Appendix B.
After the hours and type of support that will be required
from shore based commands was determined, the cost was calcu-
lated. Shore based personnel are assumed to do 29 hours/week
of productive work by the DWS group at the Naval Ship Engi-
neering Center. The shore support was assumed to be performed
by Navy personnel stationed at commands dedicated to the sup-
port of the low manning ships. As an average personnel in
paygrade E-3 were assumed to do the unskilled work while E-5*s
of the appropriate skill category do the skilled work. An
^3

average cost for the personnel in each skill category was calcu-







With the hours of shore support required per week, the work
week, and the cost of each skill category available, the cost
of thirty years of shore support was determined.
The method used to estimate crew cost is accurate, as-
suming that the results of the manning model are accurate. The
fuel use determination is based on the assumption that average
fuel rate and endurance fuel rate are the same. The fuel cost
for the thirty year life of the ships is assumed to be #12. /bb.
The assumption about average fuel rate is reasonable based on
CODESHIP estimates, but the $12, /bb may not be, A sharp in-
crease in fuel cost would give an added advantage to small ships
in a LCC comparison due to their lower fuel use. This could
change the relative ranking of the ships in the study.
The cost of shore support is based on the PP 1052 Manning
Document, and the assumptions that elements of the work load
are related to crew or ship size. The FP 1052 Manning Docu-
ment has been refined using information gathered on operating
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PP 1052 class ships, and is considered accurate. Administrative
and support functions were assumed to be handled in a conven-
tional manner on all the ships in the study, thus the major
assumption that some of the work load is proportional to the
crew size is realistic. The cost of shore support assumes that
the shore support activities are fully utilized. If they are
not used to full capacity, the cost will rise. Any inaccuracies
here apply to all the ships in the study, thus the relative ac-
curacy is unaffected,
2.5 Ship Performance
As discussed in Section 2.1, the intention was to hold
performance constant on all the ships in the study. This was
done by adding equipment and streamlining procedures to allow
the small crews to perform as well as the large crews. In
reality this was not possible, and performance decreases as
crew size decreases.
The performance was evaluated on the ability of the ships
to perform the functions in Table 1. Each ship was rated in
each category using the scale below.










1 Very greatly reduced
No capability
Some of the functions can be performed well with a small crew
due to automation. Other functions, such as fire fighting after
battle damage, are manpower intensive, and thus performance
falls in almost direct proportion to crew size.
The evaluation was subjective, taking into account the
following factors.
The crew size and composition
The watch stations manned
The type and performance of the equipment
installed
The doctrine under which the ship operates
Prom this an overall description of the capabilities of each
ship was developed.
No firm approach to performance evaluation was developed,
thus the results are based primarily on the author's subjective
evaluation. As a result, this part of the analysis contains
the greatest uncertainty. Because of the uncertainty, no
quantitative ranking of the ships in the study was attempted.
The qualitative ranking in performance is based primarily on
the time available to perform critical maintenance functions.
In addition to producing a qualitative ranking, it is felt that
this method can identify ships which would be unacceptable
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because of equipment availability problems. The identifica-
tion of ships with unacceptable performance is important be-
cause they will have a low Life Cycle Cost, and thus would
otherwise be an attractive option from a standpoint of cost.
2.6 Impact of Reduced Shipboard Manning on the Personnel System
The present training system of the Navy relies heavily on
shipboard training. After basic training a large percentage
of personnel go directly aboard ships. Other personnel receive
training in a particular skill before reporting aboard ship,
but in both cases, shipboard training and experience are re-
quired before the individual can be effective. During the
period of shipboard training, the trainees perform the large
amount of unskilled labor required aboard conventionally manned
ships.
A ship with reduced manning has less requirement for un-
skilled labor. In addition, the skilled technicians and oper-
ators aboard ship have less time to devote to training others.
Thus changes will be required in the training system.
The crews produced using the methods in Section 2.1 are
broken down according to paygrade to give some indication of
how severe the problem will be. Among the points considered
were:
The type and number of personnel required






This part of the analysis is outside the main thrust of
the thesis, and the accuracy is unimportant as far as the
results of the rest of the analysis are concerned. The sec-
tion on impact on the personnel system was included because
some of the information developed in this thesis led to con-
clusions about the personnel system.
2.7 Summary and Evaluation of the Analytical Approach
The analytical approach just presented was intended to be
a consistant method of determining the following for each ship
in the study.






Impact on personnel system
In general, all of the information produced above tends to
be more accurate for the ships with large crews than for the
ships with small crews. This is because the large crews are
based on operating ships or ships under construction, while
the small crews are based on systems or ideas that have not
been tested in service. The most Important point concerning
^8

the accuracy of this analytical approach is that this is a
comparative study.
The absolute accuracy of the results of this study is
not critical. What is important is the relative accuracy
between the 8 ships in the study. Thus, while it may not be
possible to determine a completely accurate displacement or
LCC for the ships in this study, it is possible to be certain
of their relative standing. The same holds true for ship per-





The results of the analytical methods discussed in Chapter
2 are presented in this chapter.
3.1 Results of the Wanning and Equipment Model
A summary of ship 1, the baseline ship, is shown below













2 Antisubmarine topedo tubes
1 MK 42 5-inch dual purpose
1 Basic Point Defense
Missile launcher
2 Antiship missiles carried
in ASROC launcher
SQS-26CX sonar
SPS-40 air search radar
SPS-10 surface search radar
MK 68 gun fire control radar




2 1200 psi boilers
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The following major watch stations are required to operate
the ship in the wartime steaming condition (Condition III).
Bridge Watch 2 officers 11 enlisted/watch
Command and Control 1 12
Weapons Control 10
Engineering Control 15
A summary of ships 2 through 8 is shown in Table 3» and
a detailed listing of each ship's crew is presented in Appen-
dix C. The changes in equipment or procedures represent changes
from the previous ship, thus the table must be read from be-
ginning to end to be understood. The manning change is based
on the manning documents developed for each ship in the study.
The information on space and weight changes is predominantly
from reference 16, with the balance from reference 3t or con-
versations with Naval Ship Engineering Center personnel.
The weight and space changes in Table 3 are intended to
reflect the direct changes due to equipment substitutions and
additions. The change in ship displacement is larger. No di-
rect weight or space changes were assigned to personnel changes
when the Postal Clerk, Maintenance Administrator, Personnel
Clerk, and Ship Servicemen were eliminated from the crew. These
personnel were no longer required full-time because of reduc-
tions in crew size. The facilities they used, such as a laundry
or office space, are still required to some lesser extent. The
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facilities in proportion to reductions in crew size, thus the
displacement of the ship is affected appropriately. The space
and weight changes for second order effects are shown as zero
for the same reason.
Figure k shows each ship's crew according to function,
while Figure 5 shows the crews according to paygrade. The
most striking feature to emerge from Table 3 and Figures 4 and
5 is the sharp drop in manning between ships 1 and 4. Figure 4
shows that the manning reduction is almost entirely due to a
reduction in watchstanding. Ship 1 was manned in a fashion
similar to the FF 1052 which has a high concentration of watch-
standers. A characteristic of many of the watches is that much
of the time is spent unproductively. This is especially true
on the bridge during all but the most active of watches, and in
the engineering spaces where most of the time on watch is spent
monitoring equipment and recording gage readings. A second
characteristic is the repetitive nature of many of the functions
performed, which makes them subject to automation. For example,
functions such as steering, recording course changes and instru-
ment readings, and monitoring machinery can be performed by
relatively inexpensive automatic devices. The high level of
man-hours expended on these functions not only makes them ex-
pensive in terms of man-hours expended, but tends to lower the
feeling of self-worth of the people involved.
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Figure 5, Crew Size and Composition
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following personnel required for the major watch station dur-
ing Condition III.
Ship 1 Ship k
Bridge Watch 2 officers 11 ertliste<1 loi'ficer 2
Command and
Control







Total on Watch 3 48 2 10
Ship k has a reduction of 75% from the number of personnel it
took to perform the same functions on ship 1. This reduction
in watchstanding allows the crew size to be reduced by 135 men
when support personnel for the watchstanders are eliminated.
Table 3 shows that the equipment changes to make the 135
man reduction are not excessive. The biggest change is the
change from steam to gas turbine for main propulsion. Another
large equipment change is the addition of 2 computer, 7 display
console tactical data system. The computer hardware in ships
2 through 8 is basically the same. What is required is in-
creasingly complicated software. Software has almost no ship
impact, but can take years and millions of dollars to develope.
The equipment required on the bridge to support the small
deck watch is modest. Three changes were made.
Ship 2
Bridge equipment was integrated into a single console




Collision avoidance device installed
In addition to the equipment changes, the signal and navigation
skills were assumed to be integrated into a ship control divi-
sion. This allows more efficient utilization of personnel.
Ships 5 through 8 are in sharp contrast to ships 1 through
k>. In ships 1 through ^ the reduction in crew size is made
possible by the addition of equipment or changes in procedure
which replaces or aids the watchstanders. The last four ships
make reductions in crew size more at the expense of maintenance
and administrative functions than by replacing people with
equipment. Note that the number of watchstanders remains al-
most constant on the last four ships.
The last ship, ship 8, has the smallest possible crew with
the level of technology allowed in the model. Any smaller crew
would result in the crew being unable to accomplish essential
operational functions. The feasibility and acceptability of
the ships is discussed further in the section on performance.
A direct comparison between the ships developed in this
study and the PPG 7 is difficult due to differences in equip-
ment and mission. In terms of crew size only the PFG 7, with
18^ men, falls between ships 2 and 3. If the large sonar, ASROC,
and 5-inch gun that the ships in the study carry were substi-
tuted for the second helicopter and missile system on the PPG 7,
the PPG 7 would show only a slight increase in crew size. Thus
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it is clear that the FPG 7 is manned similar to ships 2 and 3,
and represents a large reduction in manning compared to the
PP 1052.
The limitations of the manning and equipment model which
were discussed in Section 2.1 should be kept in mind when
reading the results shown in Table 3« Of particular importance
is the fact that much of the equipment and procedures used on
ships k through 8 is based on reference 3«
3.2 Results of the Ship Design Model
The CODESHIP model was first run with payload and equip-
ment constant and only the crew size varying. This was done
to determine the impact of manning changes on the ships with-
out interference from equipment changes. A summary of the
results is shown in Table 4.
A second run of CODESHIP was made with the equipment list
varying as noted in Table 3 to support the manning level on
each ship. A summary of the results is shown in Table 5«
The acquisition cost is discussed in later sections.
The results of the model for ship length and fuel were as
expected. The displacement is reduced by about 25% between
ship 1 and 8 in both runs, but length is reduced by only 9%,
while endurance fuel load is reduced by only h.$%. The small
reduction in length occurred because all the ships in the study
















1 276 4276 427 691 72.88
2 199 3926 414 681 70.66
3 171 3801 410 676 69.86
4 139 3654 404 672 68.92
5 120 3568 400 669 68.37
6 99 3474 397 665 67.76
7 88 3410 394 663 67.36
8 70 3342 391 661 66.92
TABLE 5











1 276 4276 427 691 72.88
2 199 3866 412 678 72.53
3 171 3716 409 676 74.37
4 139 3549 402 670 75.63
5 120 3466 398 667 75.55
6 99 3368 395 663 74.93
7 88 3304 392 661 74.52
8 70 3236 389 660 74.08
Millions of 1974 dollars
63

smaller crews, the length drops less because volume is a cubic
function of length for ships of similar shape. The fuel re-
quired for endurance range is a function of the required power
at the endurance speed of 20 knots. Power is not a strong func-
tion of displacement, and thus endurance fuel is not reduced as
fast as displacement. An example is a comparison of the FF 1034
and PP 1044. The displacement of the PP 1034 is 50% of the
displacement of the FP 1044, however, the power required at
20 knots for the PP 1034 is 85# of that required for the PF 1044.
The relatively small decrease in required fuel and length
have an impact on the LCC of the ships in the study. , The cost
of fuel and upkeep of the hull did not decrease as fast as ship
displacement. This will be discussed further in the section
on LCC.
The displacement versus crew size when payload and equip-
ment is constant is shown in Figure 6. Note that ship 1 is
over 200 tons heavier than the modified FP 1052, which has ex~
actly the same payload and crew. The only changes are the use
of a gas turbine propulsion plant and the improved habitability
standards. A steam version of ship 1 was run on C0DESHIP to
investigate these two changes. The steam version was even
larger than ship 1, thus the impact of improved habitability
standards is responsible for the 200 ton growth in displacement.
Prom Figure 6 marginal weight factors for manning can be
determined. The marginal weight factor for manning is defined
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man is added or removed. It depends on the habitability stan-






These figures show that the impact of the crew is greater on
small ships such as those are under discussion here.
Prom Figure 6 when the payload was held constant, the
marginal weight factor for manning was found to be 4.52 tons/man.
The results of a number of other studies are shown below.
Study Cotton (24) Howell/Graham (25) DG Study (26)
Tons/man for
SrS^hSk- *' 5 5 - 3 3 '9to6 - 3
ability
A number of factors can cause a variation in marginal
weight factors for manning. The model used to do the analyses
is the largest factor. This study and reference 24 used CODE-
SHIP, while the others used NAVSEC's surface combatant ship
model DD07. The models have different data bases and different
approaches to the calculations. The other large factor is the
assumptions made about the type of ship to be run. Howell and
Graham in reference 24 showed variations in the marginal weight
per man depending on:





Whether the ship is Weight or Volume
Limited
The size of the ship
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the power plant and the electrical
plant were held constant. If these two systems had been al-
lowed to vary with the crew size, the marginal weight factor
for manning determined in this study would have been greater.
The displacement versus crew size when payload varies to
suit crew size is also shown in Figure 6. This plot reflects
the change in displacement when the crew size was reduced and
equipment was changed according to Table 3* This series of
ship designs is the one that was used in the LCC evaluation.
There are three equipment changes with large displacement
impact.
Ship 2
Light weight 5-inch gun replaces MK k2 5-inch gun -5^ tons
NTDS (two computer 7 display) added +15
Ship 3
Only one boat carried versus two - 8 tons
The weights above are direct impact. The changes in displace-
ment are larger due to secondary effects.
The reduction in direct payload weight of 39 tons on ship
2 and eight tons on ship 3 can be seen in Figure 6. The slope
between ships 1 and 3 is greater than the overall trend. The
other equipment changes were too small to be reflected in a
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noticeable change in the slope of the displacement curve.
The average marginal weight of one man over the range from
ship 1 to ship 8 is 4.71 tons/man when payload changes are con-
stant. It is interesting to compare this number, which repre-
sents the combined effect of crew and equipment changes, with
the figure of 4.52 tons/man when only the crew is changed. It
would have been reasonable to expect a smaller marginal weight/
man because equipment had to be added to support the lower man-
ning level. The reverse effect is due almost entirely to the
large decrease in weight which came about with the replacement
of the heavy MK 42 gun with the light weight MK 45. It should
be pointed out that the substitution was made because of the
large manning reduction associated with the MK 45 gun and not
the weight savings.
For the changes among the systems with lower weight im-
pact, the newer, more capable, low manning systems were as a
rule smaller, lighter, and require less support than the systems
they replaced. This is due to the fact that the new systems
tend to use solid state digital equipment while the older sys-
tems tend to use equipment of the tube technology era.
The approach used in this study gives a technological
advantage to the ships with low manning because they have more
modern equipment. In reality, all ships built in the same time
frame would share the same technology. The important point is
that the equipment required to permit much smaller crews need
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not have a large Impact on the displacement of the ship.
One final point needs to be mentioned. The CODESHIP
model does not make adequate distinction between the space
and weight requirements of officers, Chief Petty Officers
(CPO's) and other enlisted. CODESHIP makes a distinction only
in the area of personal effects, when in reality officers and
CPO's have greater amounts of furnishings and space. In conven-
tionally manned ships this is no problem because the ratios of
officers and CPO's to the rest of the crew is more or less con-
stant. Such is not the case in this study. As the crew size
is reduced, the ratio of officers and CPO's to the rest of the
crew increases. This leads to a small overestimation in the
CODESHIP estimation of the marginal weight per man. This effect
was noted, but no specific correction was made.
3.3 Results of the Acquisition Cost Model
Using the results shown in Table 3, it is now possible to
estimate the cost required for construction plans, Test and In-
strumentation (T&I), stock spares and development. Using ref-
erence 19 as discussed in Section 2.3, Table 6 was produced.
The total cost increment shown for each ship was added to the
cost output of the CODESHIP model to obtain total ship acqui-
sition cost.
Construction plans and stock spares cost would not be ex-
pected to vary much with ship size or complexity for small es-




ASSUMED END COST INCREMENTS*
Ship Number 123^5678
Construction plans .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8
cost
Test and instrumen- .1 .3 -5 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
tation cost
Stock spares cost .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .
1
Development cost .1 .5 .8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Total 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
* Costs are in millions of 197^ dollars averaged over an
assumed 50 ship buy.
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only small variation in cost in these categories for small es-
cort ships. The values shown in Table 6 are average values
assuming a 50 ship buy.
Development and T&I were estimated to vary with ship com-
plexity as shown in Table 6. These results are based on a
subjective comparison of the ships in the study with the ships
in reference 19. There is a great deal of uncertainty in these
results because of the method used, and because some of the
ships in the study are more complex than any represented in
reference 19. The error associated with this method has a
relatively small impact on the final results because the error
is spread over each of the 50 ships in the assumed buy.
The acquisition costs produced when all equipment and pay-
load items were held constant (as in FF 1052) and only manning
varied, is shown in Figure 7. Also shown in Figure 7 is the
acquisition cost produced when payload and equipment varied to
suit the crew size. When the payload was held constant and
only the crew size varied, the plot of acquisition cost versus
manning was a straight line. The acquisition cost varies from
$72,880,000 for ship 1 with a crew size of 276, to $66,920,000
for ship 8 with a crew of 70. The marginal cost per man was
found to be $28,932 in terms of 197^ dollars. Other recent
results are shown below.
Source Year Dollars Marginal Cost
Howell and Graham (25) 1976 $^9,770/raan
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Figure ?. Crew Size Versus Ship Acquisition Cost
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The results of this study fall between the two shown above.
The difference among the marginal cost results above is largely
due to increases in the cost of ship acquisition between 1973
and 1976.
As mentioned in the last section, the displacement is
reduced by 2$% between the largest and the smallest ship. The
cost is only reduced by 8.2^ however. This is because the re-
duction in size is in the hull, which is relatively less expen-
sive than the other parts of the ship. A large part of the
cost of a ship is in the electronics and weapons and their
development, and this is the same regardless of ship size.
The CODESHIP run when equipment and payload were varied
to suit the crew size is the more important of the two. Here
the reduction in acquisition cost due to a smaller crew is off-
set by the cost of the equipment required to make up for the
smaller crew. The largest items added in terms of cost were:
2 computer 7 display computer system
(for both NTDS in ships 2 and 3, and
for the fully integrated systems
starting with ship k)
Automatic Detection and Tracking (ADT)
systems (Starting with ship k)
Other equipment changes had little impact on the cost. For
example, the cost of an integrated bridge console is little
different from the conventional equipment it replaces, and the
dual purpose fire control system is comparable in cost to the
two systems it replaces. Thus the slope of the cost curve
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between ships 4 and 8 is very close to that of the curve as-
suming payload constant.
When equipment and payload vary note that the acquisition
cost of ship 2 is less than for ship 1, even though an expensive
computer system was added. This is because most of the crew
reduction occurred as a result of the switch from steam to gas
turbine main propulsion. The cost of these two systems is
basicly the same and the reduction in acquisition cost due to a
smaller crew more than offsets the cost of the computer system.
Ships 3 through 8 require some expensive equipment additions,
thus the acquisition cost increases. The manning reductions
aboard ships 5 through 8 were made predominantly by deferring
maintenance until in port. The cost trend between ships 5 and
8 would be different if a different approach to maintenance had
been used. The cost shown in Figure 7 assumes that maintenance
the crew is unable to accomplish is simply transferred ashore.
If redundance, self-testing, plug-in plug-out, or other devices
had been used to reduce the time required for maintenance, the
ship acquisition cost for ships 5 through 8 would be substan-
tially higher.
Note also that when equipment is varied, the cost trend
runs counter to the weight trend. In terms of cost, the new
equipment tends to cost as much as the old (in the same year
dollars) even though the new equipment is smaller. Thus the
cost per ton of the smaller ships rises. It appears unlikely
7^

that ship acquisition cost can be reduced by building the
smaller ships permitted by smaller crews.
3.*» Results of the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Model
As discussed in Chapter 2, the elements of Life Cycle Cost




Cost of Added Shore Support
The results of the crew and fuel cost calculations are shown
in Table 7.
Table 8 shows the average hours of shore support required
per week in each of the skill categories for each ship in the
study. The detailed results for each category are shown in
Appendix D. The negative numbers in Table 8 are the average
hours of shore support required per week in each category. The
positive numbers are the hours per week available in excess of
requirements. The assumption was made that excess hours in one
skill category could not be transferred to a category with a
shortage of available hours. This assumption is valid because
of the high degree of training required for most Jobs, and be-
cause Navy traditions and regulations precludes the skilled
workers from being assigned to unskilled labor. The last col-
umn shows the thirty year cost of the required shore support.




THIRTY YEAR CREW AND FUEL COST




l 276 132.96 691 38.014
2 199 98.65 678 37.299
3 171 86.72 676 37.189
4 139 72.35 670 36.859
5 120 61.86 667 36.694
6 99 53.88 663 36.473
7 88 47.65 661 36.363
8 70 36.89 660 36.308
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give a modified LCC. This is shown in Figure 8.
A number of interesting points emerge from Figure 8. The
first is the large percentage of LCC taken up by crew cost in
ship 1. The cost of the crew is 5^% of the items included in
this LCC estimate, compared with 29% for ship acquisition cost.
If full LCC was available, the percentage devoted to ship
acquisition cost would be even less. In spite of this, when a
new ship is proposed the attention of the Congress, the Navy,
and the public, is focused on the acquisition cost of the ship.
Some progress toward reducing LCC has been made in the
latest escort type ship to be built. The FFG 7 falls between
ships 2 and 3 in this study in its approach to manning and
automation. In a ship of this type the crew cost falls to ap-
proximately 45$ of LCC. The percent of LCC devoted to crew
cost continues to decline as manning is reduced. However, the
cost of shore support becomes an important factor beginning
with ship ^. Thus while crew cost declines to only 21# of LCC
by ship 8, the total manpower cost (crew and shore support) of
ship 8 is 36#. In fact, by ship 8 the cost of manpower has
leveled off in terms of both total amount and percentage.
When ship acquisition cost is plotted on the compressed
scale of Figure 8, and compared with the other costs shown in
the figure, it appears almost constant. This indicates that
several million dollars extra spent on ship acquisition to
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Figure 8. Life Cycle Cost Versus Crew Size
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when viewed with all the other components that make up LCC.
As mentioned in Section 3*2, the required fuel load
changed very little with changes in displacement. The result
of this is seen in Figure 8. As was expected, the cost of fuel
over the thirty year life of the ships in the study is about
the same regardless of displacement.
3.^.1 The Work Breakdown by Function
At this point in the analysis, sufficient information is
available to determine the amount of time required for each of
the functions, such as watchstanding, aboard the ships in the
study. The results for the at sea case are shown in Fugure 9.
The total time in Figure 9 represents the productive time
available per week. Time lost to inefficiencies and military
diversions are not shown. Note that over 57% of the productive
time aboard ship 1 is spent on watch, but that this percentage
is reduced sharply between ships 1 and k. Only 33$ of the
productive time available on ship b is spent on watch. The
FFG 7 with 184 men is shown for comparison. The FFG 7*s work-
load is very similar to the workload aboard ship 3. Thus the
manning aboard the FFG 7 represents a great deal of progress
from the manning aboard the FF 1052. The definition of Admin-
istration and Utility Manning is slightly different in the
FFG 7 Manning Document when compared to the FF 1052 Manning
Document. This change in definition is responsible for the
change in relative value of Administration and Utility Manning
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In addition to the sharp reduction in time spent on watch
between ships 1 through 8, note that the smaller crews require
less time devoted to Facilities Maintenance, Administration,
and Utility Manning. This is a result of the second order
effects discussed in Chapter 2. At the same time, the amount
of Preventive and Corrective Maintenance increases on the ships
with small crews due to the equipment required to support the
reduced crews.
It is clear from Figure 9 that in order to reduce crew
size below the 100-1^0 man range, sharp reductions will be
required in the time spent on Maintenance, Utility, and Admin-
istration Manning. Reductions in watchstanding alone will
not be sufficient.
3.5 Results of Ship Performance Analyses
The results of the ship performance analyses are shown
in Table 9.
The two most important areas to consider when judging a
ship's performance are the combat system, and the engineering
plant. The combat system aboard ship 1 is characterized by:
Manual operation
Many operators in a hierarchical required
to engage a hostile contact
Voice communication between decision
makers and operators








Detect aircraft at long and short 55688888
range
Engage aircraft with five-inch gun 56788888




Detect submarines at long and short
range
Engage submarines at long and short





Engage submarines at long range with 55000000
nuclear weapons




Engage surface contacts with gun
Conduct electronic warfare
Conduct naval gun fire support
55555555










Mobility 1 2 3^5678
Steam at full power 55555^^3
Repair propulsion and auxiliary 555^^321
systems
Control damage 555^^321
Maintain damage security 55555^33
Special Warfare
Surveillance and reconnaissance 55555555
Visit, search, and prize crew 55^^3332
Command and Control
Communicate by visual and electronic 555^^^^^
means
Process message traffic 55555555





Administration and supply support 5555^^-^3








Enter and leave port
Refuel and rearm underway



















Only the last characteristic is an advantage, the others result
in slow and inefficient operation. The end result is a combat
system that is very quickly overwhelmed in a multi -threat en-
vironment. Ship 1 was the baseline ship, and thus was rated 5
in all categories. Ship 2 has a conventional NTDS, which im-
proves the command and control of the ship, but leaves the
same fire control systems. The MK 45 gun that replaces the
MK 42 on ships 2 through 8 has about half the rate of fire as
the MK 42. However, in practice it was found necessary to
reduce the firing rate of the MK 42 gun into the range of the
MK 45 because of reliability problems. Thus the firing rate
was not considered significant in evaluating the ships. Over-
all, ship 2 offers little change in performance from ship 1.
Ship 3 with the dual purpose MK 92 radar replacing the
MK 68 and BPDMS fire control radars has a much improved cap-
ability in the AAW and SUW areas. Ships 4 through 8 have a
fire control system composed of two AWG 9 radars. The AWG 9
is basicly automatic. Operator involvement is limited to moni-
toring the system and initiating attacks on hostile targets.
The MK 92 system and the AWG 9 system both offer greatly im-
proved performance, but in either case, if part of the system
fails, there is little in the way of back-up or manual modes of
operation. The same problem exists with the Automatic Detec-
tion Tracking (ADT) systems used in ship 4 through 8. When
they work, ADT's have proven to be better than human operators.
If ADT's fail on a ship with a very small crew, there simply
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will not be enough operators to take over their functions.
The reliability and availability of the combat system
should not be affected by decreases in manning. Table 8 shows
sufficient time is available in the combat system skill cate-
gory to do all preventive and corrective maintenance. The only
exception is ship 8 where 269 hours of shore support is required
per week.
A significant reduction in ASW performance takes place
with ship 3- The capability of carrying nuclear weapons is
forfeited. The impact of nuclear weapons aboard a ship is
measured in terms of personnel much more than in terms of hard-
ware. Two technicians and one guard are required to test or
repair nuclear systems. In addition, training, drills, and
paperwork are greatly increased. A ship with reduced manning
simply cannot maintain the required security.
The deck watch in ship 1 requires eleven people. Ship 2
performs the same functions with six people by integrating the
normal bridge equipment into one console, and adding an auto-
matic steering device. One lookout and the Junior Officer of
the Deck are also eliminated. Ship 3 through 8 have a console
that was designed for two-man operation. It has a collision
avoidance device and navigation aids in addition to the equip-
ment in ship 2. Even with the improved equipment, the perfor-
mance of the bridge team will decline in certain areas. For
example, no amount of electronics can fully replace the three
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lookouts or two signalmen normally found on a surface ship.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the smaller ships in the study
have a speed advantage over the larger ships because all the
ships use the same ^0,000 horsepower gas turbine propulsion
plant. The CODESHIP estimation for the top speed of ship 1 is
.26 knots less than the top speed of ship 8. This range of
speed difference was not considered to significantly increase
the performance of the small ships.
The engineering department is the foundation for the rest
of the ship. Without mobility and electrical power, all the
other systems are useless. As the crew size is reduced, the
performance of the propulsion plant is virtually unaffected
until ship 6. At this point Table 8 shows a large increase in
deferred maintenance and as a result, performance will suffer.
The Damage Control (DC) function is not seriously degraded un-
til ship 6 is reached. Ship 6 has only two small damage con-
trol parties, compared with the normal three. Ship 7 has only
one small damage control party, and ship 8 has virtually no DC
capability, thus damage control capabilities in ships 7 and 8
would be judged unacceptable by Navy standards.
Some special functions will be difficult to accomplish for
a ship with a small crew. These functions are manpower inten-
sive and hard to automate. As an example, the smaller crews
in this study cannot possibly supply a prize- crew. because there
are simply too few ship control and propulsion operators to
supply crews for two ships.
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Special sea details, such as Sea and Anchor, were not
considered to be a problem. In the Navy these functions are
manpower intensive largely because the manpower is available,
while commercial ships perform exactly the same function with
very small crews.
The rankings in each function in Table 9 cannot be added
to produce an overall ranking of performance. Ships 7 and 8
are unacceptable because of serious deficiencies in maintenance
gnri damage control, yet they have only a slightly lower point
total than ship 1, thus simple addition would give the wrong
impression.
In general, performance is unaffected by the crew reduction
in ships 1 through 5, with the exception of the loss of nuclear
weapon capability.
Ship 6 is only marginally acceptable because the large
amount of deferred maintenance raises doubt about the avail-
ability of equipment. Ships 7 and 8 are unacceptable for the
same reason, in addition to the fact that damage control capa-
bilities are unsatisfactory.
The reader should view Table 9 and the comments in this
section with some skepticism. In order to obtain an accurate
evaluation of ship performance, a full systems evaluations
would have to be performed, and a manning document prepared
using the DWS process for each ship in the study. This requires
a number of skilled professionals and a great deal of time, thus
it was beyond the scope of this thesis.
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3*6 Effect of Reduced Manning on the Personnel System
The graph of crew composition versus crew size (Figure 5)
presented in Section 3*1 Implies a far reaching impact on the
Navy's personnel system. On ship 1, which is typical of the
ships now in service, personnel in low paygrades (E-l through
E-4) make up 61% of the crew. This falls to 22# on ship 8.
The reduction in percentage of people at the low end of the
skill scale implies an increase in the percentage at the top,
and this is shown in Figure 5» The number of officers and high
ranking enlisted personnel drops only slowly as the crew size
is reduced, because the bulk of the reduction in crew size is
at the expense of low ranking personnel.
This effect will cause problems in the training system.
Currently, a large amount of training is carried out on board
ship. If training billets are added to a ship with reduced
manning, the advantages of reduced manning are lost. A pos-
sible solution lies in changes to the way enlisted men are
detailed during their first four years of service.
Normal detailing procedures consist of:
Basic Training
Entry level training in a particular skill
Completion of obligated service at sea
A new approach consisting of the following elements will be




One year or less on a ship (mess cook,
deck division, ship familiarization)
One year at a shore support command
(perform low skill maintenance in
support of low manning ships, attend
schools, and receive on the JOD training
in rate)
Spend the remaining four year obligation
at sea
In the past, personnel with certain skills have spent most
of their time at sea. This system would allow their skills to
be used ashore. The sailor who stays in the Navy past his four
year obligation can look forward to a rotation between sea duty
and the shore support activities. In the long run this should
pay off with improved morale and a better retention rate, which
would in turn help the rate structure problem mentioned above.
In addition to the rate problem mentioned above, the ship
with a small crew will conflict with present Department of
Defense (DOD) policy which allows a maximum of 70% of all en-
listed personnel to be rated (paygrades E-4 through E-9). Ship
1 is well within this constraint as only 62$ of the enlisted
crew is rated. The PFG 7 is the first ship with a manning doc-
ument which calls for more than 70$ of the enlisted crew to be
rated. A large number of such ships will make it impossible for
the Navy to live within the 70# limit. Fortunately this con-
straint can be changed at the DOD level and personnel at the
Bureau of Personnel expect a change within two years to accommo-
date the PPG 7.
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Although Figure 5 doesn't show it, the ship's officers
have the same training problem as the enlisted men. The ships
in the lower end of the manning range have no Ensign billets.
The only watchstations for officers are as one of a two-man
bridge watch team and Tactical Action Officer in Combat Infor-
mation Center. It is hard to imagine an Ensign filling either
job. Some form of training ashore must be devised which will
provide a supply of skilled officers to man these small ships.
As mentioned above, the small ships require a greater aver-
age level of skill than the larger ships. This is only partly
reflected in the increased rate structure. The individuals on
ships with very small crews will have to have more general
training than is the present practice. This will result in
an increase in cost for any given rate. The nature and cost of
the extra training was beyond the scope of this thesis and was
not taken into account.
3.7 Summary of Results
A brief summary of the results presented in this chapter is
shown below.
Ship 1 the baseline ship, has the following features.
Crew 276 men
Displacement 4276 tons
Acquisition Cost $72.88 million
Life Cycle Cost $2*4-5.00 million





Acquisition Cost $ 72.53 million
Life Cycle Cost $209.00 million
The reduction in crew size between ships 1 and 2 is predomi-
nantly due to the change from 1200 psi steam to gas turbine for
main propulsion. Other crew reductions are as a result of re-
duced bridge manning, reduced gun manning, the addition of a
NTDS command and control system, and second order effects. All
the manning reductions are due to reduced watchstanding, either
directly or indirectly. The manpower devoted to equipment
maintenance is greater on ship 2 than ship 1, so equipment
availability and performance should be improved. Note that
acquisition cost is virtually unaffected between ship 1 and
2 because the increased cost of the more sophisticated equip-
ment is offset by the decrease in ship size. At the same time,
LCC drops sharply due to the reduction in personnel cost.
Ship 3 has the following features.
Crew 171 men
Displacement 3716 tons
Acquisition Cost $ 74.37 million
Life Cycle Cost $199.00 million
The reduction in crew size between ships 2 and 3 occurs because
of changes to the combat system. A dual purpose fire control
system replaces the two systems required for gun and missile
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fire control. This results in a reduction in both operators
and maintenance personnel. Other watchstanding requirements
are reduced by using an integrated ship control console with
navigation aids, and by eliminating the capacity to carry
nuclear weapons. The number of personnel available for main-
tenance peaks on this ship, so equipment availability should
be very good. Some combat capability is lost due to the fact
that no nuclear weapons are carried, and only a four-man bridge
watch is used in Condition III. Note that acquisition cost
increases by two million dollars due to the more complex equip-
ment and software required, but that a ten million dollar re-
duction in LCC results due to reductions in personnel cost.
The PPG 7 is very close to ship 3 in terms of manning concept,
thus many of the comments about ship 3 would apply to the FFG 7.
Ship b is considered to be the most attractive alternative.
It has the following features.
Crew 139 men
Displacement 35^9 tons
Acquisition Cost $ 75.63 million
Life Cycle Cost $189.00 million
The largest manpower savings on ship 4 are as a result of im-
provements to the combat system, which has automatic fire con-
trol, and automatic target detection and tracking capabilities.
Ship k is also the first ship to transfer part of its main-
tenance load to shore support activities. The combat perform-
ance of this ship is good, but the automatic features leave
9^

little in the way of back-up or casualty modes of operations.
This results in greatly reduced performance in the event of
equipment failure or battle damage. It is interesting that
the most attractive ship also has the highest acquisition
cost. This is due to the equipment changes and additions re-
quired to support the low manning. In spite of the increased
acquisition cost, the LCC is reduced by ten million dollars
when compared to ship 3«
Ship 5 is the first ship to transfer large amounts of
maintenance to shore support activities. It has the following.
Crew 120 men
Displacement 3^66 tons
Acquisition Cost $ 75.55 million
Life Cycle Cost $182.00 million
Because ship 5 f s crew size is reduced primarily by transferring
functions ashore, and not by adding equipment, it's acquisition
cost is less than for ship 4. The performance of this ship is
reduced due to a two-man bridge watch, a one-man communications
watch, and a reduced maintenance capability.
Ships 6 through 8 are similar in most respects. Ship 6
has the following characteristics.
Crew 99 men
Displacement 3368 tons
Acquisition Cost $ 7^.93 million
Life Cycle Cost $176.00 million
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Ship 8 has the characteristics shown below.
Crew 70 men
Displacement 3236 tons
Acquisition Cost $ 7^.08 million
Life Cycle Cost $172.00 million
Ship 7 falls between ships 6 and 8 for all the values above.
These three ships have small crews almost entirely because
maintenance and other functions were transferred ashore. This
is reflected in a reduced number of personnel devoted to main-
tenance on these ships, and a sharp increase cost of shore
support. The performance of ship 6 is marginal due to short-
comings in equipment maintenance and damage control. Ships 7
and 8 are considered unacceptable for the same reasons. The
number of hours of maintenance transferred to shore support
activities indicates that not only preventive maintenance,
but also corrective maintenance will be deferred. Very few
personnel are available for damage control activities during
Condition I, and this leads to reduced performance because
damage control is difficult to automate. Automatic and in-
stalled systems have a high probability of being damaged by





4.1 Summary of Conclusions
This thesis has examined the impact of reduced manning
aboard Naval ships. The significant conclusions which have
been drawn from this analysis are as follows:
1. Manning reductions of 50% compared to the FF 1052 and
25% compared to the FPG 7 are possible in the next generation
of ocean escorts using technology now available.
2. Reduction in watch stations is the key to reducing
manning into the 120-160 man range from the 268 men on the
FF 1052. To go below this level of manning, more reliable
equipment or a change in maintenance philosophy is required.
In addition, time required for support and administrative
functions must be reduced.
3. The systems required to support a crew of 120 to 160
men are:
Gas turbine or automatic steam propulsion plant
Integrated combat system
Integrated ship control console, and regulation
changes to take advantage of it.
Gun and missile systems which are unmanned in
Condition III.
k. The speed of response necessary to control a gas turbine
or a modern combat system requires a great deal of atuomation.




5. The ship performance is not seriously affected as the
crew size is reduced from 268 to 140 men, because equipment
changes offset the reduction in personnel. Ships with crews
below 120 men were not satisfactory. In order for acceptable
ships to be built below this range, technological improvements
(many of which are under development) would be needed.
6. Reduced shipboard manning is unlikely to reduce ship
acquisition cost. Reducing crew size "saves" steel and "costs"
electronics. Even if crew size can be reduced with no equip-
ment changes, the marginal cost for one man is less than .0^%
of the acquisition cost. Reductions in acquisition cost of
ships should not be the motivation for reducing crew size.
7. The motivation to reduce crew size is to save on person-
nel cost, which is far the largest item in Life Cycle Cost.
8. As expected, crew cost decreases as crew size decreases,
however, the average cost per man increases due to changes in
rate structure and training requirements.
9. The total cost of personnel (ship and shore based)
starts to level off for ships with crews of less than 120 men.
10. The productive hours per week are greater at sea than
in port. This means that a person assigned to a ship will
accomplish more than the same person assigned to a shore sup-
port activity, if the ship can use his services on a full time
basis.
11. From the standpoint of performance, it is better to
98

have one technician aboard ship and available 100# of the time,
than to have two technicians available the 50% of the time the
ship is in port.
12. The tendency to "overman" must be avoided. This re-
quires equipment that will gain the operators confidence, and
operators that understand and support the motivation to reduce
manning.
k.2 Recommendations for Further Study
Reduced shipboard manning is a subject which affects almost
all aspects of ship design. Some areas where further research
is desirable include:
1. The crew size and composition used on the ships in
this thesis should be verified, using the Design Work Study
Method.
2. Further work is required to validate the ship perform-
ance results obtained in this thesis.
3. The experience gained from the FFG 7 and DD 963 must
be studied and applied before the next generation of ships with
still smaller crews can be constructed.
k. Concepts which have been proposed to reduce shipboard
manning, such as the application of minicomputers to shipboard
functions, automatic food service, disposable clothes, and
others, must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
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SAMPLE CODESHIP INPUT AND OUTPUT
Input and output data for the PF 1052 as first constructed
is presented here. The output is compared with the character-
istics of the actual FP 1052 in Table A-l.
TABLE A-l
COMPARISON OF FP 1052 AS BUILT AND AS PREDICTED
As Built As Predicted Actual/Predicted
Length 415.0 ft. 416.4 ft. .996
Beam 46.6 46.7 .998
Draft 15.0 15.0 1.000
Hull depth 28.7 29.5 .973
Displacement
light








SUS SPO BOILSIZE 17500.00 SP^CL wT O.OC
ENO SPO 20.00 NUMBOILS 2.00 0.00
RANGE ENG SIZE 35000.00 SPECL^FM 0.00
SHIPTYPE 1.00 NUM ENGS 1.00 O.OC
HULL CP 0.58 EN1 LOC 1.00 0.00
HULL CX 0.81 GEARTYPE 1.00 COO
HULL L/B 3.91 SHFTTYPE 1.00 0.00
HULL B/H 3.11 NUMSHFTS 1.00 0.00
BSTN/B 0.85 DOME LOC 0.00 0.00
HULLKOTE 1.00 0.00 0.00
NUM COMP 3. CO 0.00 YE ACCOST 1974.
P
C
HULL MAT 2.00 0.00 NUV PROD 5C.0C
PILOTMAT 2.00 0.00 INFLATN 7.00
SUPVPCT 22.00 3.00 LAB RATE A. 98
HULLTYPE 1.00 OFFACCOM 22.00 OVERHEAO 92.00
HNGR HT 0.00 CPOACCOM 22.00 DE LABOR 5.67
L MIN 0.00 ENLACCOM 24?. J
:
DEOyRHED 12. JZ
L MAX 9G0.00 SHIPOAYS 4'5.00 PROFIT 10.00
B MIN 0.00 ELECT KW 3000.00 PLANS F 20COOOO.OO
B MAX 90.00 TRPACCOM 0.00 TST IN L1500CC00.00
H MIN 0.03 TRPDAYS 0.00 TST IN F 100000.00
H MAX 90.00 0.00 FUT">£ L O.OC
0.00 0.00 FUTURE F 0.00
0.00 COO STCKS^ L 35OCC0O.C0
PP TYPE 2. CO DCMRGPCT 0.00 STCKSP F COO
HULLTYPE STANDARD PCWR^LNT HIPRSTEM HULL M AT HITENSTL
SHIPTYPE COMBATNT ENO LCC AVIDSHIP PILOTMAT ALUMINUM
GEARTYPE L^KDTRAN HULLKOTE VINLRES
SHFTTYPt HCLLOVI
PAYLOAD SPECIFICATIONS
QNTY ITEM QNTY ITEM QNFY ITEM QNTY IF C M QNFY ITEM
1.00 1 I. 00 136 12.00 295
1.00 12 1.00 150 162. OC 345
1.00 20 I. 00 186 1.00 361
1.00 42 1.00 193 l.O: 372
i.00 63 1.00 189 1.00 472
1.00 67 2.00 206 1.00 473
I. 00 75 2.00 209
100.00 80 1.00 231
1.00 81 1.00 247
1.00 96 1.00 256
1.00 104 1.00 267
1.00 115 60C00 275
1.00 131 8.00 287
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VOL WT TOTWT CALWT FREBRD VOLRAT B/H j GM/tt
IT ITS TONS TONS FEET PCT FE^T f>CT
1 2. 3846.8 9.66 77.72 3. 11 9.64 20.96
2 2. 4C25.6 14,14 98.46 3. 11 7.98 17.07






CCMP NAME WEIGHT W VOLUME VOLUME ! CTBAS CTBAS MOMENT
TONS PCT KFT3 PCT K$ PCT KFTTON
11 BASCHULL 708.0 17.6 0.0 0.0 3028. 5.9 11.3












5051 . 9.9 17.6
21 4426. 3.7 4.9
22 ENGINES 178.1 4.4 43.9 10.0 2665. 5.2 2.8
23 TRANSMIS 60.4 1.5 5 .0 1.1 488. 1 . 0.4
24 ELECTRIC 120.0 3.0 15.6 3.6 3 85. 6. C 2.4
25 PROPELRS 8.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0. CO 0.0
26 SHP FUEL 684.
C
17.0 26.0 5.9 . c 5 .2






















33 1.3 28.1 1.4 1 .9
34 STER+TRM 82. 2.C 2 4 .5 5.6 1 129. 2.2 1 .2
35 BALLAST 0.0 0.0 CO 0.0 0. 0.0 CO
30 SHCONGRP 169.9 4.2 5 5 .8 12. 7 2541. 5.0 3.6
•
41 PERSONEL 20.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0. 0.0 .6
42 P EFECTS 10.9 0.3 .0 0.0 0. CO 0.3
43 P STORES 102.2 2.5 12 .4 2.3 r . 1.2
44 NCLOSURS 142.0 3.5 98.3 22.5 2133. 4.2 4.0
45 FURNISHG 73.8 1.8 CO CO 1274. 2.5 2.0












48 P SAFETY 0.5
40 ACOM GRP 464.5 11.5 120.2 27.5 6466. 12.7 11.2
51 BALISTIC 0.0 0.0 CO 0. D . 0.0 .0
52 TORPEDO 0.0 0.0 C .0 CO C CO CO





54 FIREPROT 31.5 0.8 3 .8 0.9 558. 1.1 .7
55 DEGAUSS 3.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 206.
.
0.4 0.2
50 SHSAFGRP 39.7 1.0 3 .8 0. 9 764. 1.5 0.9
61 LECTRONS 305.2 7.6 43.9 10.0 10357. 20.3 1 .7
62 WEAPONS
CARGO
394.7 9.8 42.5 9.7 12633. 24. 8 10.5
63 5;>.7 1.4 2.2 0.5 1<132. 3.6 1.6
64 MISCEL 16.2 0.4 0.0 0. } 22C 0.4 .6
65 SPECIAL 0.0 0.0 CO 0.3 0. 0.0
60 PAYLDGRP 771.9 19.1 38.6 20.2 25 192. 49. 1 14.4
TOTAL 4031.2 100.
C
437.7 1CC0 51110. 10C0 64. C
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DETAIL COSTS WITHOUT LEANING
CGMP NAME TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL PROFIT 3ASIC SFM TOTAL
HOURS LABOR MATERIAL COST CONST COST 3ASIC
THOUS K$ K$ K$ K$ K$ K$
11 BASCHULL 226. 2179. 573. 275. 3028. 0. 3028,
12 SEC HULL 153. 1478. 361. 134. 2C23. C. 2?23.
10 HULL GRP 38C. 3657. 935. 459. 5051. 0. 5051.
21 BOILERS 173. 1672. 2352. 402. 4426. 0. 4426.
22 ENGINES 77. 743. 1680. 242. 2665. 0, 2665.
23 TRANSMIS 16. 152. 292. 44. 48b. C. 488.
24 ELECTRIC 129. 1243. 1562. 280. 3085. 0. 3085.
25 PROPELRS C. 3. 0. 0. C. 0. :.
26 SHP FUEL 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. C. C.
27 FUEL SYS 34. 332. 150. 48. 53C. 0. 530.
20 POWR GRP 430. 4141. 6j35. K18. 11194. 0. 11194.
31 PILTHOUS 2. 21. 9. 3. 33. 0. 33.
32 NAV+COMM 16. 152. 471. 62. 685. 0. 685.
33 MOOR+RIG 33. 319. 112. 63. 694. J. 694.
34 STER+TRM 62. 602. 425. 1C3. 1129. C. 1129.
35 BALLAST 0. 0. 0. 0. o. 0. 0.
30 SHCONGRP 114. 1J94. 1216. 231. 2541. :. 2541.
41 PERSONEL 0. C. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
42 P EFECTS 0. 0. 0. 0. G. : . .:
.
43 P STORES 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
44 NCLOSURS 143. 1330. 559. 194. 2133. "C. 2133.
45 FURNISHG 62. 599. 559. 116. 1274. Q. 1274.
46 H,V,PLUM 188. 1312. 904. 272. 2987. C . 2987.
47 LIGHTING 0. 3. 0. 0. C. 0. 0.
48 P SAFETY 1. 12. 54. 7. 73. 0. 73.
40 ACOM GRP 395. 38:3. 2?76. 538. 6^66. :. 6466.
51 BALISTIC 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. G. 0.
52 TORPEDO 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. C.
53 BLAST C. :. 3. C 3. 0. C.
54 FIREPROT 3C. 286. 221. 51. 555. 0. 553.
55 CEGAUSS 7. 71. 116. 19. 206. 0. 206.
50 SHSAFGRP 37. 357. 333. 69. 764. ;. 764.
61 LECTRONS 342. 3291. 1404. 469. 5164. 5193. 10357.
62 WEAPONS 198. 1911. 964. 288. 3163. 9521. 12633.
63 CARGO 39. 375. 1290. 167. 1832. :. 1832.
64 MISCEL 9. 34. 0. 3. 93. 123. 22C.
65 SPECIAL 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.
60 PAYLDGRP 538. 5661. 3659. 932. 1C252. 14841. 25C92.
TOTAL 1942. 13714. 14258. 3297. 36269. 143*1. 51110.
OBJECT CODE= 82123 BYTES, ARRAY AREA= 32724 BYTES,
NUMBER OF ERRORS= C, NUMBER OF WA?NINGS=





When a ship is in port certain stations are manned to
provide security against intruders, fire, and flooding. The
watchstations shown in Table B-l were assumed to be manned for





Asst. Command Duty Officer
Quarter Deck Watch







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3
3
1 1 l 1 l 1 1 1





Appendix C presents the crews assumed for the ships in
this study according to rating and paygrade. Every ship in
the study was assumed to carry a Ik man helicopter detachment
consisting of three officers, one chief petty officer, and ten
enlisted personnel. These personnel are not included in the
tables of this appendix.
The ships officers are shown in Table C-l , and the en-
listed personnel are presented in Tables C-2 through C-9. For
those unfamiliar with the abbreviations used in the Navy's




Ship Commander Lieutenant Lieutenant Lieutenant Ensign
commander junior grade
1 1L 1 3 7 2
2 1L 1 4 3 1
3 JL 1 4 3 1
k 1L 1 3 4
5 3L 1 3 k
6 3L 1 3 k
7 3L 1 3 3




SHIP 1 ENLISTED CREW
Rating Paygrade
E-9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Total
3-M 1 1
YN/PN 1 1 3 5
HM l 2
QM l 2 4
OS 1 2 5 6 7 21
PC 1 1
RM 1 1 3 3 4 12
SM 1 2 3 6
BM/SN 1 1 1 3 24 6 36
ST 1 3 3 6 4 17
FT 1 1 1 4 3 10
GM . 1 1 4 5 5 16
TM 1 1
ET 3 2 1 7
IC 1 1 2 1 5
MM 1 3 7 10 3 24
BT 1 1 2 3 3 3 13
EM 2 3 1 7
EN 1 1 1 3
HT 1 2 4 1 8
FN 9 5 14
MR 1 1
SK 1 1 1 l 1 5
109

SHIP 1 ENLISTED CHEW (continued)
Rating Paygrade
E-9 8 7 6 5 * 3 2 Total
SH 112 2 6
DK 1 1
MS 12 12 1 7
Messmen 9 9
Steward 1113 6





SHIP 2 ENLISTED CREW
Paygrade
7 6 5 4 3 2 Total111 1 4
1112 3 6 3 1612 4 7 4 18
1 1 3 3 3 11
1 1 1 7 6 17
3 3 3 3 13112 3 1 8




1 2 2 1 6111 1 4
1 3 1 5
l l 1 3112 2 3 2 11
1 2 3 3 3 1 14
1 1 1 1 4




SHIP 2 ENLISTED CREW (continued)
Bating Paygrade
E-9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Total
MS 1 1 3 1 6
Messmen 5 4 9
SH 1 l 1 3 6













1 1 2 3 4 11
1 2 3 2 4 12
1 1 l 3 1 7
1 l 1 11 15
2 3 2 2 10
1 2 3 2 2 10




1 3 1 1 6
1 1 1 3
1 2 1 4
1 1 1 3
1 1 2 2 3 2 11











SHIP 3 ENLISTED CREW ( continued
)
Bating Paygrade
E-9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Total
MS 1 1 3 1 6
Messmen 3 3 6
SH 1 l 1 3 6


































1 1 2 2 2 8
1 1 2 1 2 7
1 1 1 3 1 7
1 1 1 6 10
2 1 2 1 7
1 2 1 2 1 7




1 3 1 1 6
1 1 1 3
1 2 1 if
1 1 2
1 1 2 2 2 1 9











SHIP ^ ENLISTED CREW (continued)
Rating Paygrade
E-9 8 7 6 5 <t 3 2 Total
MS 1 1 2 1 5
Messmen 4 3 7
SH 1 1 2 4


































1 2 1 5
1 1 2 2 7
1 1 2 5
1 1 6 9
2 1 2 6
2 1 1 1 6
1 1 1
1 1
1 2 1 k
1 1 1 3
1 1 1 3
1 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 8





1 1 1 3
1 1 1 1 4
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SHIP 5 ENLISTED CHEW (continued)
Bating Paygrade
B-9 8 7 6 5 k 3 2 Total
Messmen 6 6
SH 1 1 1 3















































1 1 2 1 1 6
1 2 2 2 1 9
1 1 2
1 1 2
1 1 6 8
1 1 1 3





SHIP 7 ENLISTED CREW
Paygrade
7 6 5 4 3 2 Total
1 1 2
1 1
1 1 2 ^
1 1 1 3
1 1 2 4
1 1 3 5
2 1 4
1 2 1 1 5
1 1 1 1 *
1 2 3
1 1 1 3
1 1 1 3
1 l
1 1 2 1 1 6
1 2 2 2 8
1 1
1 1 2
1 1 5 7











5 4 3 2 Total
1
1
1 1 2 4
1 1 1 3
1 2 3
1 3 4







1 1 1 3
1 1 2
1 1






1 1 3 5
6 18 10 8 6 48
121

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN APPENDIX C
BM/SN Boatswain* s Mate
BT Boiler Technician
DK Pay Records Administrator




EW Electronic Warfare Technician
FN Fireman
FT Fire Control Technician
GM Gun Ordnance Technician
HM Medical Technician
HT Hull Technician
IC Interior Communications Technician
3-M Maintenance Manager





















DETAILED WORKLOAD ACCORDING TO SKILL CATEGORY
Appendix D presents the detailed analysis of the hours
required per week for each manning function in each skill
category. The values for ship 1 are the same as for the
modified FF 1052. The change in hours required in each func-
tion for each ship was calculated using the methods in Sec-
tion 2.1. The hours available were based on the Navy Stand-
ard Work Week. The differences between total hours required
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